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It was in September 2015 that the image of three-year old Alan Kurdi, lying face down in the 
sand of a coast near Bodrum, went viral. The toddler had drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, 
fleeing from Syria to Europe with his family. The picture caused a global outcry, shedding light 
on the horrific human catastrophe that had been in the offing and ignored for quite some time: 
the European migrant crisis. Today, more than four years later, the media narrative has shifted 
from a sympathetic and empathetic response towards suspicion and hostility regarding refugees 
and immigrants (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). The influx of immigrants and asylum seekers 
declined compared to 2015, but the issue of immigration remained in the center of attention in 
Europe, especially when it comes to politics and campaigns. In recent years, right-wing populist 
parties experienced rising support, propagating xenophobia while gaining votes and seats in the 
parliaments of Europe (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
In this context, it is widely believed that the migrant crisis hardened the fronts between na-
tives and immigrants. However, discussions on that matter are often intertwined with emotions 
and political agendas; neutral evidence on the overall opinion on immigration controlling for 
an individual and national context and including data from recent years is scarce. Yet, it is 
pivotal to the political debate, that aims to successfully integrate the vast influx of immigrants, 
to take into account citizens’ view on immigration and to address the factors that cause the most 
discomfort. Precisely for this reason, this paper offers an analysis of the overall opinion on 
immigration in the context of the European migrant crisis, focusing on three main research 
questions: (1) what are the main individual- and macro-level factors shaping public opinion on 
immigration in the context of the European migrant crisis? (2) How did the public opinion on 
immigration shift during the migrant crisis? (3) And did the migrant crisis alter the magnitude 
in which certain factors affect the opinion on immigration?  
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The paper uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS) waves 6 to 9 in order to capture 
the public opinion right before and after the peak of the migrant crisis. Since the 2018 ESS data 
has only been published in the end of October 2019, it also offers a unique perspective on how 
the publics opinion on immigration has been affected in more recent years. In the following, 
chapters 2 and 3 offer a summary on the main characteristics and the economic consequences 
of the migrant crisis. Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework behind the individual- and 
macro level factors that shape the public opinion on immigration. Finally, chapter 5 contains 
the main analysis and its findings. 
2. Recent Migration Trends in Europe 
Vast refugee movements have always been part of our history. In recent years, it has been the 
European migrant crisis that has captured global attention (Apap, Radjenovic, & Dobreva, 
2019; Hatton, 2016). As a large share of immigrants between 2012 and 2018 has been classified 
as asylum seekers, this chapter summarizes the most recent migration trends in Europe with a 
special focus on asylum seekers. The following subsections offer an overview over the main 
characteristics of the European migrant crisis (Section 2.1) and an outlook on the skills of im-
migrants arriving in Europe after 2012 (Section 2.2). 
2.1 Main Characteristics of the recent European Migrant Crisis 
Conflicts in Syria and the Middle East forced hundreds of thousands of individuals to flee their 
home countries and to undertake dreadful journeys in the hope of finding asylum in Europe. 
According to Eurostat, the number of first-time asylum applicants in EU countries peaked at 
1.3 million in 2015, with a slight decrease in 2016 before plummeting down to around 735,000 
in 2017 and a near pre-crisis level around 665,000 in 2018.  
Among the most popular destinations in Europe for asylum seekers were Germany, France, 
Sweden, Greece and Italy. Germany. France and Sweden quickly became prime destinations 
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because of their well-established welfare systems, whereas Greece and Italy, due to their geog-
raphy, are the predetermined arrival destinations for asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea (Hudson, 2018). In 2015, France and Sweden faced around 100,000 asylum applications, 
whereas Germany faced five-times the amount of applicants. A year later, Germany alone re-
ceived 700,000 asylum applications according to Eurostat, cementing its status as the number 
one welfare state for refugees to seek asylum (Hudson, 2018). As depicted by the World Mi-
gration Report (IOM, 2018), most asylum claims in Europe were made by citizens from Syria, 
Iraq and Afghanistan, with a vast majority of them being from young adult males (Connor, 
2016). 
A lot of asylum seekers reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, crossing it from Libya 
to Italy or from Turkey to Greece (Hudson, 2018; IOM, 2018). Sea arrivals in Greece alone 
accumulated to 850,000 in 2015. As sea routes are treacherous and the decommissioned cargo 
ships used for the journey often in bad condition, underequipped and overcrowded (Hudson, 
2018), the number of sea fatalities is disturbingly high with 4,500 people dying solely on the 
sea route from Libya to Malta and Italy in 2017 (IOM, 2018). While not being as treacherous 
as the sea routes, the land routes are far from safe, since refugees are highly vulnerable to abuse, 
exploitation and human trafficking (IOM, 2018).  
With regard to the unprecedented influx of asylum seekers in addition to an already high 
level of immigration to both economically stable and instable European countries, it comes as 
no surprise that the migrant crisis is posing an immense challenge to EU countries and the 
European unity (Hatton, 2016; Kancs & Lecca, 2018). And even though the number of arrivals 
is on a downward trend since 2016, the long-term integration of asylum seekers and immigrants 
is still a challenge in many European countries.  
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2.2 Skills of Immigrants Arriving in the European Union after 2012 
Given that labor market integration of immigrants is a key point when discussing immigration, 
this section elaborates on the qualifications and skills of the incoming immigrants in the context 
of the European migrant crisis. This is a crucial factor, as it determines with what kind of native 
workers immigrants potentially compete on the labor market. It must be noted that the assess-
ment of skills and qualifications of immigrants that arrived in Europe after 2012 is a difficult 
task, due to the large influx and a lack of cross-country data on education and skills (Dumont, 
Liebig, Peschner, Tanay, & Xenogiani, 2016). Therefore, this subsection is based on data from 
specific countries rather than Europe wide data. 
Multiple studies have found that immigrants arriving in Europe after 2012 participate, on 
average, in the low-skill labor market. In the case of asylum seekers this can be explained 
through several reasons: first, asylum seekers often face legal restrictions that deny them access 
to the labor market for longer periods (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2018, Dumont et al. 2016). Sec-
ond, their skills are less transferable to the receiving market’s skill sets due to diverging inter-
national standards. Third, due to stigma, asylum seekers are less favorably selected by employ-
ers in their host country (Cafferty et al. 1983, Chiswick 1999, Constant and Zimmermann 2005). 
Those findings are supported by data from Turkey, UK and Germany: on the Turkish job mar-
ket, Tumen (2018) found that asylum seekers mostly compete with low-skill native workers, 
mainly because of legal restrictions. Using UK data, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) found that 
asylum seekers have worse labor market outcomes compared to native workers. Finally, the 
German IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey is offering detailed information on the level of education of 
immigrants that came to Germany during the migrant crisis (Brücker, Rother, & Schupp, 2016; 
Poutvaara & Wech, 2016), according to which the level of education for asylum seekers in 
Germany is very polarized: While 32% of them received a secondary educational degree (which 
is above the German average of 29%), 10% of the asylum seekers only finished primary 
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education and 9% do not hold a degree of any kind. Moreover, 12% completed tertiary educa-
tion, but only 6% completed an apprenticeship. And compared to the 88% finishing more than 
ten years of education in the German population, Brücker et al. (2016) quantified this share 
with 55% for asylum seekers, indicating that, on average, the level of education and therefore 
the level of skills is lower for asylum seekers compared to German natives.  
In conclusion, most evidence indicates that a vast majority of the immigrants that arrived in 
Europe after 2012 are most likely competing with the low-skilled workers on their host coun-
try’s labor market.  
3. Economic Impact of the European Migrants Crisis 
Immigration has always been part of Europe, yet the unprecedently large influx of immigrants 
during the migrant crisis has brought a new dimension to a persistent discussion about immi-
gration and its economic consequences for Europe. As outlined in Section 2.2, the majority of 
immigrants that arrived between 2012 and 2018 is competing on the low-skill labor market. 
Therefore, this chapter focusses on the economic consequences of low-skill immigration from 
poorer countries in general and offers a more in-depth look on the economic consequences of 
the European migrant crisis. These elements are essential for an understanding of the public 
opinion on immigration. 
The economic consequences of immigration on the receiving country is subject to an ongo-
ing discussion (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). According to the textbook model of a competitive 
labor market, immigration should cause adverse effects on wages in the receiving labor market 
because labor supply increases (G. Borjas, 2013). Nonetheless, a long strand of empirical evi-
dence refutes the existence of adverse effects and claims that the impact on the average worker’s 
wage and employment are small or close to zero (i.e., Card 1990; National Research Council 
1997; Clemens and Hunt 2017) . By contrast, Borjas (2003) found negative effects of an 
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increase in labor supply through immigration on wages in a scenario where native workers and 
immigrants are perfect substitutes in both education and experience. A key difference between 
both findings is the assumption of perfect substitutability of native workers and immigrants. 
When loosening this strict assumption, the adverse effects of an immigration surge have been 
found to be attenuated (Card, 1990; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012). Furthermore, even if they exist, 
they would be short-termed, as the increase in labor supply changes the composition of the 
output mix. Hence, the economy expands its capacities and absorbs the influx of immigrants by 
producing more of such goods that use the additional labor supply (Card, 1990; Dustmann, 
Glitz, & Frattini, 2008; Dustmann, Hatton, & Preston, 2005; Dustmann & Preston, 2007). 
Focusing solely on the low-skill labor market, an influential paper examining the aftermath 
of the Mariel Boatlift found that an increase in low-skill labor supply by 7% had no significant 
effects on wages and unemployment of low-skilled workers (Card, 1990). Moreover, a study 
on the fall of the Berlin wall showed that native low-skilled workers were even benefitting from 
low-skill immigration in the long run (Brücker & Jahn, 2011). 
In conclusion, literature on the consequences of immigration on wages and employment in 
the receiving country implies that the direction and magnitude of its impact strongly depend on 
the substitutability between immigrants and native workers. In a case where the substitutability 
is imperfect, the economic impact on wages and unemployment of low-skill native workers will 
be rather small and therefore neglectable. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence outlined in the previous paragraphs is limited as it 
does not consider an influx of immigrants as large as during the European migrant crisis. More-
over, most literature does not take into account that Europe is increasingly struggling with a 
diminishing and ageing workforce due to low fertility and higher life expectancy (Sides & 
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Citrin, 2007). While long-term economic consequences are so far only subject so speculation, 
the following paragraphs will offer a brief overview on the existing empirical evidence.  
In order to fill the research gap on this subject, Kancs and Lecca (2018) assessed the expected 
long-term effects of the European migrant crisis, focusing on economic, fiscal and social con-
sequences. According to their findings, the integration of asylum seekers, albeit being costly in 
the short-run, yields significant socioeconomic and fiscal benefits in the medium- and long-run. 
Their findings are in line with a 2016 IMF report that emphasized the importance of a sound 
integration into the labor market and the resulting economic benefits for the host country. More-
over, Kancs and Lecca (2018) found a positive correlation between the initial investments into 
integration at arrival and the long-run benefits.  
All in all, existing empirical evidence suggests that the European migrant crisis might be 
costly in the short-run but might bring socioeconomic and fiscal benefits in the long-run. 
4. Key Factors Shaping the Public Opinion on Immigration 
As long as there has been immigration, there has been an ongoing academic discussion on the 
determinants that shape an individual’s opinion on immigration. Gradually, the scientific com-
munity began focusing on two main channels: economic fears and cultural values (de Vries & 
Hoffmann, 2016; Hatton, 2016). Economic fears are sparked from the substantial changes in 
the labor market composition of the receiving country and the fiscal consequences caused by 
immigration. They affect public opinion by increasing perceived economic insecurity and by 
generating a feeling of being left behind (de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 
2016). By contrast, cultural values are expected to shape public opinion on immigration through 
a perceived cultural distance between the native population and immigrants, causing a fear of 
losing the national identity through cultural heterogeneity (Dustmann & Preston, 2007). The 
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following paragraph will offer a summary about the ongoing academic discussion over fears 
and values and provide its main empirical results. 
A main finding in the literature on economic fears was an apparent relationship between 
higher levels of education and a positive attitude towards immigration, the so-called education 
effect (Hatton, 2016). Using US data, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) found that low-skilled work-
ers were significantly less likely to be in favor of immigration. Their findings were confirmed 
by Ortega and Polavieja (2012) and Malhotra, Margalit, and Hyunung Mo (2013), who found 
that the education effect is stronger among workers that exhibit a higher propensity to compete 
with low-skilled immigrants, and in countries with a higher share of low-skilled workers.  
But the education effect is not the only channel through which economic fears shape opin-
ions on immigration. A strand of literature focused on the impact of welfare concerns regarding 
immigration opinion. On the bottom end of the income distribution, individuals might fear to 
compete with immigrants for a fixed supply of welfare benefits from the government, while 
individuals on higher ends might fear potential tax implications induced by the burden of im-
migration on government spending (Hatton, 2016). In line with this hypothesis, Facchini and 
Mayda (2009) were able to show that the attitude towards low-skill immigration was negatively 
related to income, even after controlling for education. Their findings are supported by Boeri 
(2010) and Dustmann and Preston (2007), who also found an adverse connection between per-
ceived fiscal burdens and immigration opinion. 
Despite of this evidence, many academics, in particular from the field of political science, 
have been opposing the economic fear hypothesis, emphasizing the role of cultural values 
(Citrin & Wong, 1997; Rustenbach, 2010). A strong argument for the cultural values hypothesis 
has been proposed by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007): according to their analysis of ESS data, 
higher levels of education translate into a higher opinion on immigration regardless of the skills 
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and qualifications the immigrants inhabit, thus partially refuting the economic fears hypothesis. 
Moreover, Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012) used a simple latent factor analysis to show that 
cultural values have a 2-5 times stronger impact on immigration opinion than economic fears. 
Finally, Manevska and Achterberg (2013) tested both channels by studying to what extent the 
share of immigrants in the population drives immigration opinion. They concluded that cultural 
values have a higher explanatory power, especially for low-educated individuals who are very 
influenceable by authoritarian values.  
Sides and Citrin (2007) give credit to both hypotheses, claiming that economic fears, cultural 
values and the level of information about immigration are significantly shaping the public opin-
ion on immigration after analyzing ESS data from 2002. They also aimed to explain country 
variation by including macro-level variables such as the overall state of the economy or the 
share of immigrants in a country, finding them to be insignificant. These results have been 
reassessed by Hatton (2016), who claims that, while it is likely that macro-level variables do 
shape the opinion on immigration, research so far mainly focused on cross-sectional data omit-
ting a time-dimension. He argues that in order to identify driving macro-level factors, a time 
dimension must be included into research. 
In conclusion, literature on immigration gives three main suggestions for this paper: first, on 
an individual-level, both the economic fears and the cultural values hypothesis must be included 
into the model. Second, macro-level variables, such as GDP and the unemployment rate, cannot 
be neglected. Third, in order to fully understand the relationship of macro-level variables and 
immigration opinion, the analysis must include a time dimension. 
5. The Analytical Approach 
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion outlined in chapter 4 by examining the key 
factors shaping public opinion on immigration in the context of the European migrant crisis and 
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by including a time dimension, in order to analyze the effects of macro-level variables on im-
migration opinion. Subsection 5.1 summarizes the data used, subsection 5.2 presents the meth-
odology and subsection 5.3 presents the results.  
5.1 Preferences towards Immigration in Europe 
The data analyzed in this paper are from the European Social Survey rounds 6 to 9. The ESS is 
a repeated cross-sectional survey that is conducted biennially. This cumulative data set was 
chosen because it provides the opportunity to examine the changes in immigration opinion in 
the context of the European migrant crisis. The country coverage has not been consistent for all 
years in question. Therefore, this paper will only analyze the 18 countries that are included in 
all four rounds between 2012 and 2018. The main focus of the analysis is placed on five ques-
tions from the ESS that will serve as dependent variables: 
• (1) To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic 
group as most [country] people to come and live here? (1=many/2=some/3=a few/4=none) 
• (2) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? 
(1=many/2=some/3=a few/4=none) 
• (3) How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? (1=many/2=some/3=a 
few/4=none) 
• (4) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to 
live here from other countries? (range: 0 = bad, 10 = good) 
• (5) Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by peo-
ple coming to live here from the other countries? (range: 0 = undermined, 10 = enriched) 
As Table 1 shows, the average opinion on immigration from a different and the same ethnic 
group is, at a country-level, higher than those of immigrants from poorer countries outside of 
Europe. When examining the variation in means over the years, it strikes that most questions  
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Table 1: Average opinion on immigration by country and year 
exhibit a positive trend over 
the span from 2012 until 
2018, except for the question 
on the cultural enrichment by 
immigrants. This apparent 
upward trend comes surpris-
ing, as the media narrative 
became increasingly negative 
over the same period. In order 
to examine whether the upward trend is a result of the European migrant crisis, the paper will 
examine the public opinion on immigration controlling for a variety of individual- and macro-
level factors. Finally, the differences across countries are striking: while Hungary exhibits com-
parably low values for the attitude on immigration from poorer countries outside of Europe and 
from different ethnic groups, northern countries such as Sweden and Norway exhibit very high 
values. The question arises if these country differences can be explained on an individual-level 
within a country, or if they are caused by cross-country variation on a macro-level.  
5.2 Methodology  
The approach used in this paper can be considered as an altered replication of Hatton’s approach 
in his 2016 paper, applied in the context of the European migrant crisis and extended with 
elements from an analysis by Inglehart and Norris (2016). Following Hatton (2016), the fol-
lowing country-fixed effects regression of 𝑌𝑖𝑐 on all individual-level explanatory variables is 
conducted in a first step, using robust standard errors to control for heterogeneity:  
𝑌𝑖𝑐 =  𝑋𝑖𝑐𝛼 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝜂 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐                        (1) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           (1) Poor      (2) Same (3) Different   (4) Improve    (5) Enrich 
          countries     ethnicity     ethnicity       economy       culture 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Country                                                                     
BE             0.58          0.75          0.60          0.60          0.77 
CH             0.58          0.81          0.62          0.81          0.77 
CZ             0.26          0.40          0.26          0.47          0.46 
DE             0.65          0.88          0.71          0.76          0.79 
EE             0.32          0.70          0.44          0.64          0.71 
ES             0.54          0.62          0.56          0.70          0.81 
FI             0.38          0.66          0.48          0.71          0.90 
FR             0.55          0.74          0.60          0.61          0.66 
GB             0.46          0.62          0.54          0.64          0.65 
HU             0.12          0.47          0.19          0.46          0.64 
IE             0.49          0.63          0.53          0.66          0.73 
LT             0.38          0.62          0.49          0.70          0.66 
NL             0.56          0.71          0.66          0.70          0.81 
NO             0.70          0.83          0.74          0.78          0.76 
PL             0.54          0.67          0.54          0.69          0.81 
PT             0.46          0.57          0.49          0.63          0.73 
SE             0.84          0.90          0.88          0.75          0.88 
SI             0.50          0.71          0.57          0.52          0.67 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year 
2012           0.49          0.66          0.54          0.66          0.75 
2014           0.46          0.68          0.55          0.65          0.73 
2016           0.53          0.70          0.55          0.68          0.71 
2018           0.52          0.72          0.56          0.71          0.71 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6-9. Means calculated using design weights. 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑐 is a vector comprised of the five dependent variables derived from the ESS question-
naire. The variables have been converted into binary variables that reveal whether an individual 
has a positive attitude towards immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe (1), from 
the same ethnic group (2), from a different ethnic group (3), and whether an individual perceives 
immigrants to have a positive impact on the economy (4) and culture (5). The subscript i  marks 
the individual and c labels countries. 𝑋𝑖𝑐 is a vector comprising a set of individual-level varia-
bles that are expected to shape an individual’s overall opinion on immigration. Finally, 𝛾𝑐 cap-
tures the country-fixed effects, while 𝜖𝑐 is an idiosyncratic error term.  
According to Eurostat data on asylum applications and an analysis of google trends featuring 
the online search of the key words “European migrant crisis” (Figure 1, Appendix G), the crisis 
climaxed towards the end of 2015 in both the number of refugees arriving and public attention. 
Accordingly, the model captures the time-dimension using 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖, a binary variable indicating 
whether the data is from before the migrant crisis (2012 and 2014) or after its peak (2016 and 
2018). The model is estimated controlling for endogeneity by including country- and time-fixed 
effects on the one hand, and by omitting attitudinal variables on the other hand. Based on the 
empirical findings on key factors of immigration opinion (4.1), the individual-level variables 
are grouped into three categories: Socioeconomics, economic fear related variables and cultural 
value related variables, and tested for the baseline regression assumptions, including a Hausman 
test for fixed effects (Appendix E). Since age is unlikely to exhibit a linear relationship with the 
overall opinion on immigration, it is included in form of age brackets, each comprising 20% of 
the sample population. 
In a second step, macro-level variables are included into the model and the following regres-
sion is estimated:  
𝑌𝑖𝑐 =  𝑋𝑖𝑐𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝛽 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝜂 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐                      (2) 
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Where 𝑍𝑖𝑐 comprises five macro-level variables: the share of first-time asylum applicants, the 
share of foreign population, the logarithm of GDP per capita, the share of social benefits in 
GDP and the short-term unemployment rate. They were first entered individually and then sim-
ultaneously into the model in order to determine the direction of their relationship with the 
overall opinion on immigration.  
Finally, in order to answer the third research question on whether the European migrant crisis 
altered the magnitude in which the individual- and macro-level variables shape the opinion on 
immigration, an additional model was estimated that considers interactions between selected 
independent variables and the crisis dummy: 
𝑌𝑖𝑐 =  𝑋𝑖𝑐𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝛽 + 𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝜃 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝜂 + 𝛾𝑐 +  𝜖𝑖𝑐                    (3) 
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑐 comprises interaction terms between particularly significant, independent variables 
and the crisis dummy, which were individually entered into the model.  
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. The signs of the esti-
mated regression coefficients were, according to literature and common sense, expected as fol-
lows: on an individual-level, variables such as age, economic insecurity, being a native and the 
self-placement on the left-right scale for political orientation should exhibit a negative relation-
ship with immigration opinion. By contrast, being part of an ethnic minority and higher levels 
of education are expected to entail a positive relationship (Hatton, 2016, 2017; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2016). The relationship for different levels of income as well as for being part of the 
labor force are only subject to speculation, as they will confirm or refute the economic fears 
hypotheses: individuals on the lower end of the income distribution and participants of the labor 
market are expected to have a negative relationship due to labor market competition and welfare 
concerns, while people on higher ends should exhibit a negative relationship if they fear the 
cost of immigration in form of potential tax implications. Following Inglehart and Norris (2016) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory  
variables 
𝑍𝑖𝑐 includes four indicator variables that reflect 
the level of authoritarian values an individual 
holds: the importance of feeling safe, a preference 
towards a strong government, the importance of 
following traditions and customs and the im-
portance of following rules. All variables are 
measured on a scale from 1 to 6 while the higher 
values on the scales regarding the four variables 
measuring authoritarian values are expected to 
come with a negative sign (Hatton, 2016). 
5.3  Results 
The following section offers a summary of the 
main results. The first part focusses on the ques-
tion on what factors shape the attitude towards mi-
gration on an individual- and macro level in the 
context of the migrant crisis. Afterwards, the 
question on whether immigration opinion shifted 
during the crisis is examined. Finally, the last par-
agraph analyses how the crisis affected the indi-
vidual- and macro-level factors shaping the opinion on immigration. 
Individual-level Effects on the Overall Perception of Immigration 
Table 3 summarizes the regression estimates of 𝛼, comprising the coefficients of individual-
level variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑐 (Equation 1). The country-fixed effects are not shown here, but can be 
found in Appendix C. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Individual-level sociodemographics 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
         age | 
       32-43 |    130,022    .1890065    .3915153          0          1 
       44-55 |    130,022    .2052576    .4038913          0          1 
       56-67 |    130,022    .2042424    .4031484          0          1 
       68-100|    130,022     .192975    .3946351          0          1 
         sex |    130,356    .4712326    .4991737          0          1 
     brncntr |    130,323    .8998642    .3001822          0          1 
    ethminor |    129,042    .0553541    .2286709          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
2. Individual-level economic fear related variables 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
    education| 
      middle |    129,571    .4951957    .4999788          0          1 
       high. |    129,571    .2317031     .421922          0          1 
    ecoinsec |    129,041    .2149937    .4108196          0          1 
    lbrforce |    130,381    .5681273    .4953388          0          1 
      income | 
  2nd decile |    106,603    .1066949    .3087264          0          1 
  3rd decile |    106,603    .1058694    .3076719          0          1 
  4th decile |    106,603     .109359    .3120906          0         1 
  5th decile |    106,603    .1065542    .3085471          0          1 
  6th decile |    106,603    .1041622    .3054722          0          1 
  7th decile |    106,603    .1031022    .3040937          0          1 
  8th decile |    106,603    .1002317    .3003101          0          1 
  9th decile |    106,603    .0843879    .2779699          0          1 
 10th decile |    106,603    .0845192    .2781662          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Individual-level cultural values related variables 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
   religious |    129,326    .3793437    .4852256          0          1 
     lrscale |    115,914    5.104888    2.167307          0         10 
 
authoritarian| 
       values| 
      1.safe | 
           2 |    128,513    .0650207    .2465633          0          1 
           3 |    128,513     .099772    .2996969          0         1 
           4 |    128,513    .1923385    .3941391          0          1 
           5 |    128,513    .3662275    .4817746          0          1 
           6 |    128,513    .2647203    .4411859          0          1 
             | 
2.strong gov | 
           2 |    127,680     .048974    .2158145          0          1 
           3 |    127,680    .0989427    .2985862          0          1 
           4 |    127,680    .2016682    .4012473          0          1 
           5 |    127,680    .3822995    .4859511          0          1 
           6 |    127,680    .2565006     .436703          0          1 
3.traditions | 
           2 |    128,415    .1023556    .3031166          0          1 
           3 |    128,415    .1422264    .3492835          0          1 
           4 |    128,415    .2267181    .4187103          0          1 
           5 |    128,415    .3181326    .4657531          0          1 
           6 |    128,415     .172986    .3782367          0          1 
    4. rules | 
           2 |    127,816    .1783892    .3828416          0          1 
           3 |    127,816    .1760891    .3808974          0         1 
           4 |    127,816    .2339691    .4233544          0          1 
           5 |    127,816    .2665785    .4421718          0          1 
           6 |    127,816    .0909354    .2875184          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Macro-level variables 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       lngdp |    130,381    10.14945    .6167467    
      socben |    130,381    26.47561    5.248681      15.35      35.65 
        ftap |    128,367    .1101281    .1529721       .003       .879 
     foreign |    130,381    .1157332    .0581054       .016       .287 




Table 3: Correlates of immigration opinion across individuals 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
              countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.046**          0.031**          0.005            0.031*          -0.027    
                 (2.48)           (2.60)           (0.27)           (1.97)          (-1.57)    
age 
32-43            -0.049***        -0.036***        -0.049***        -0.011           -0.005    
                (-6.68)          (-5.76)          (-6.81)          (-1.34)          (-0.68)    
44-55            -0.067***        -0.042***        -0.067***        -0.013           -0.008    
                (-5.57)          (-5.61)          (-5.79)          (-1.19)          (-0.69)    
56-67            -0.100***        -0.046***        -0.082***        -0.009           -0.017    
                (-7.04)          (-4.26)          (-5.41)          (-0.57)          (-1.25)    
68-100           -0.135***        -0.056***        -0.115***         0.007           -0.019    
                (-8.49)          (-3.81)          (-5.96)           (0.38)          (-1.22)    
sex              -0.018**         -0.009           -0.010            0.020***        -0.023*** 
                (-2.60)          (-1.54)          (-1.28)           (3.35)          (-4.34)    
Born in          -0.037**         -0.047***        -0.055***        -0.082***        -0.065*** 
country         (-2.48)          (-3.50)          (-3.56)          (-5.17)          (-4.53)    
ethnic            0.018           -0.002            0.022            0.025            0.025    
minority         (1.53)          (-0.18)           (1.43)           (1.70)           (1.51)    
education 
middle            0.049***         0.075***         0.069***         0.066***         0.058*** 
   .             (6.04)           (9.20)           (7.75)           (7.64)           (6.31)    
high              0.166***         0.165***         0.190***         0.186***         0.155*** 
                (13.28)          (14.22)          (16.01)          (16.34)          (11.72)    
economic         -0.051***        -0.068***        -0.060***        -0.066***        -0.048*** 
insecurity      (-4.90)          (-9.02)          (-7.25)          (-6.52)          (-4.45)    
Participation    -0.018***        -0.022***        -0.019***        -0.021***        -0.013**  
in labor market (-3.29)          (-4.28)          (-3.27)          (-3.77)          (-2.45)    
Income 
2nd decile       -0.001            0.001           -0.011           -0.001           -0.000    
                (-0.07)           (0.10)          (-1.28)          (-0.14)          (-0.00)    
3rd decile        0.006            0.020**          0.004            0.005            0.006    
                 (0.88)           (2.21)           (0.40)           (0.52)           (0.66)    
4th decile        0.015*           0.033***         0.015            0.007            0.021**  
                 (2.10)           (3.70)           (1.45)           (0.71)           (2.49)    
5th decile        0.017**          0.036***         0.017            0.020*           0.020**  
                 (2.19)           (3.80)           (1.69)           (1.96)           (2.29)    
6th decile        0.022**          0.046***         0.030**          0.039***         0.033*** 
                 (2.33)           (4.02)           (2.80)           (3.94)           (3.03)    
7th decile        0.034***         0.058***         0.045***         0.040***         0.033*** 
                 (3.14)           (5.61)           (3.96)           (3.98)           (3.30)    
8th decile        0.032***         0.064***         0.048***         0.048***         0.042*** 
                 (2.92)           (6.17)           (4.74)           (3.90)           (4.03)    
9th decile        0.057***         0.080***         0.072***         0.083***         0.052*** 
                 (4.67)           (7.35)           (5.92)           (7.63)           (4.69)    
10th              0.066***         0.083***         0.076***         0.094***         0.060*** 
                 (4.94)           (5.99)           (6.25)          (10.87)           (6.22)    
religious         0.044***         0.022***         0.032***         0.049***         0.041*** 
                 (5.18)           (3.32)           (4.02)           (7.42)           (5.56)    
safe=2           -0.021            0.003            0.000            0.025**          0.020    
                (-1.60)           (0.40)           (0.04)           (2.22)           (1.46)    
safe=3           -0.021           -0.004           -0.005            0.021            0.015    
                (-1.25)          (-0.43)          (-0.32)           (1.61)           (1.29)    
safe=4           -0.033*          -0.004           -0.012            0.016            0.007    
                (-1.85)          (-0.37)          (-0.82)           (1.20)           (0.55)    
safe=5           -0.057***        -0.015           -0.039**         -0.015           -0.008    
                (-3.06)          (-1.42)          (-2.34)          (-1.23)          (-0.54)    
safe=6           -0.080***        -0.038***        -0.060***        -0.032**         -0.033*   
                (-3.87)          (-3.05)          (-2.92)          (-2.12)          (-1.97)    
strgov=2          0.016            0.019            0.023*           0.022*           0.035*** 
                 (1.20)           (1.61)           (1.81)           (2.05)           (3.39)    
strgov=3          0.007            0.017            0.012            0.023*           0.033**  
                 (0.62)           (1.39)           (0.94)           (2.06)           (2.32)    
strgov=4          0.002            0.029**          0.015            0.022*           0.029**  
                 (0.14)           (2.29)           (1.09)           (1.81)           (2.27)    
strgov=5         -0.021            0.027*          -0.009            0.000            0.007    
                (-1.44)           (2.09)          (-0.67)           (0.04)           (0.48)    
strgov=6         -0.046***         0.013           -0.036***        -0.022           -0.019    
                (-3.01)           (1.04)          (-3.13)          (-1.73)          (-1.36)    
trad=2           -0.010            0.001            0.001            0.003            0.008    
                (-1.19)           (0.17)           (0.14)           (0.33)           (1.36)    
trad=3           -0.029**          0.001           -0.007           -0.005            0.006    
                (-2.35)           (0.06)          (-0.57)          (-0.57)           (0.75)    
trad=4           -0.039***        -0.012           -0.021           -0.005            0.002    
                (-3.05)          (-1.14)          (-1.72)          (-0.67)           (0.29)    
trad=5           -0.053***        -0.018           -0.039**         -0.027**         -0.023*** 
                (-4.50)          (-1.59)          (-2.88)          (-2.86)          (-3.27)    
trad=6           -0.061***        -0.030***        -0.048***        -0.040***        -0.046*** 
                (-6.07)          (-3.52)          (-4.26)          (-4.15)          (-5.11)    
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rule=2           -0.023***         0.002           -0.013**          0.010            0.003    
                (-3.28)           (0.19)          (-2.12)           (1.54)           (0.42)    
rule=3           -0.034***        -0.008           -0.027***         0.008            0.005    
                (-4.04)          (-0.99)          (-3.38)           (1.00)           (0.51)    
rule=4           -0.046***        -0.021*          -0.041***        -0.000           -0.004    
                (-4.54)          (-2.07)          (-3.93)          (-0.05)          (-0.44)    
rule=5           -0.054***        -0.030***        -0.051***        -0.005           -0.013    
                (-5.93)          (-3.26)          (-5.89)          (-0.63)          (-1.09)    
rule=6           -0.054***        -0.045***        -0.049***        -0.023*          -0.030**  
                (-4.40)          (-4.13)          (-3.56)          (-1.83)          (-2.42)    
left/right       -0.027***        -0.012***        -0.025***        -0.012***        -0.016*** 
pol.orientation (-6.88)          (-4.69)          (-6.95)          (-3.31)          (-3.36)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
The coefficients of all age brackets reveal that an increase in age has an increasingly negative 
effect on the opinion on immigration, being significant for the opinion on immigrants from poor 
countries, from the same and from different ethnic groups. Furthermore, the findings suggest 
that males are more averse towards immigration from poorer countries and their perceived im-
pact on culture. Yet, males perceive the impact of immigrants on the economy as significantly 
more positive than female individuals, which could be explained through working experiences 
male natives have with immigrant workers. In line with Hatton's (2016), findings, natives have 
a significantly worse opinion on immigration overall than non-natives, whereas being part of 
an ethnic minority has no significant impact on immigration opinion.  
Analyzing the results of the economic fear related variables, we find that education has a 
significant and positive effect on the overall opinion on immigration (column 1 to 5), growing 
in magnitude with increasing education levels. This result is in line with expectations and un-
derlines the economic fear hypothesis: highly educated individuals feel less threatened by low-
skilled immigrants than individuals with a low level of education. Moreover, feelings of eco-
nomic insecurity result in a significantly negative effect on the overall opinion on immigration. 
The economic fear hypothesis is further supported by the finding that being a participant of the 
labor force (either being an active part of it or unemployed but seeking employment) negatively 
affects all five dependent variables, most likely because they experience a stronger competition 
between themselves and immigrants. The coefficients of the deciles along the income distribu-
tion become more positive when moving from bottom to top deciles, gaining in magnitude and 
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significance along the way. This result is in line with the theory that individuals at the bottom 
of society feel more threatened from immigration and are therefore less in favor of it, while it 
contradicts the theory of welfare concerns regarding potential tax implication for high-income 
individuals on an individual-level. 
Regarding the variables that are related to cultural values, the estimation output suggests a 
significantly positive relationship between religiousness and the overall opinion on immigra-
tion, while the self-placement on the left-right political orientation scale exhibits a highly sig-
nificant but negative coefficient. The latter indicates that people who place themselves towards 
the right end of the scale are less in favor of immigration and its consequences. Individuals who 
value safety a lot (safe = 6) have a significantly more negative attitude towards immigration. 
The results are more polarized for the preference towards a strong government: individuals who 
do not fancy a strong government have a more positive opinion on immigrants’ impact on the 
economy and on culture, whereas individuals who do fancy a strong government are signifi-
cantly less in favor of immigration from poorer countries or from a different ethnicity. Being 
in favor of traditions and customs has an increasingly negative effect on the attitude towards 
immigration, especially from poor countries. A similar pattern is observed for the importance 
of obeying rule. All in all, the results highlight how individuals with a high propensity towards 
authoritarian values are significantly less in favor of immigration.  
In conclusion, the individual-level regression points out that economic fears, cultural values 
and socioeconomic variables are shaping the public opinion on immigration. Hence, both hy-
potheses designed to explain immigration opinion on an individual level can be verified in the 
context of the European migrant crisis. Despite controlling for individual characteristics and 
the time dimension, the country-fixed effects found in the individual-level regression are sig-
nificant for most countries with varying signs (Table 4, Appendix C). Seemingly, not only the 
composition of individuals within a country determines public opinion on immigration, but also 
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macro-level factors. Hence, the following paragraphs will summarize the findings of including 
macro-level variables into the model to account for the country variation. 
Macro-level Effects on the Overall Perception of Immigration 
The scarce literature on multilevel cross-sectional studies examining the impact of macro-level 
variables on immigration opinion only found mixed or weak evidence of their role. (Hatton, 
2016; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Moreover, only very few models consider their variation over 
time. This paper will contribute to this literature by adding a time-dimension to a multilevel 
cross-sectional regression model (Equation 2). In a first step, each of the 5 macro-level variables 
in 𝑍𝑖𝑐 is added individually to the five baseline regression equations (Table 5). In a second step, 
three macro-level variables are simultaneously included into the regression and finally, the co-
efficients of all macro-level variables included simultaneously are estimated (Table 6).  
Table 5: Correlates of immigration opinion on a macro-level 
As shown in 
Table 5, neither 
the share of for-
eigners in the 
population, nor 
the share of 
first-time asylum applicants, nor the short-term unemployment rate have a significant effect on 
the overall opinion on immigration. The logarithm of GDP p.c. is negative and significant for 
columns 1 to 3 and 5. It seems plausible to conclude that wealthier countries are less in favor 
of immigration as they have more wealth to lose. The share of social benefits in GDP is found 
to be significant for columns 1, 2 and 4 with a negative sign for all three coefficients, implying 
an adverse relationship between the extent of social welfare spending and the opinion on im-
migration and the perceived impact on the economy. The coefficient being insignificant for the 
perceived impact of immigrants on culture is in line with the economic fear hypothesis, as the 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
             countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
foreign          0.165            0.374            1.386            0.083            0.029    
                (0.21)           (0.59)           (1.35)           (0.11)           (0.04)    
stue             0.013           -0.002            0.009           -0.001            0.015    
                (1.61)          (-0.29)           (1.20)          (-0.14)           (1.70)    
socben          -0.007*          -0.011***        -0.006           -0.012***        -0.003    
               (-1.82)          (-4.36)          (-1.48)          (-3.16)          (-0.51)    
ftap            -0.040           -0.008           -0.021           -0.043           -0.029    
               (-1.29)          (-0.48)          (-0.95)          (-1.34)          (-0.73)    
lngdp           -0.086***        -0.051**         -0.068***        -0.038           -0.039**  
               (-4.06)          (-2.45)          (-3.59)          (-1.63)          (-2.15)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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extent of the social welfare state has no cultural implications. Even more, this finding underlines 
the existence of social welfare concerns among the population regarding immigration.  
Table 6: The effect of multiple macro-level variables on immigration 
opinion. 




the model confirm 
that the share of for-
eigners and of first-
time asylum appli-
cants in the population 
as well as the short-
term unemployment 
rate are insignificant 
in almost all combina-
tions. On the other 
hand, the significance of social benefits in GDP and GDP p.c. is reconfirmed, even though their 
significance regarding certain dependent variables changes depending on the other macro-level 
variables included with them. Those deviations are not surprising, since the model captures a 
lot of country-variation with only few macro-level variables. A negative coefficient for the 
short-term unemployment rate on the perceived impact on the economy is in line with common 
sense, implying that a country with higher unemployment rates perceives immigrants more as 
a threat on the labor market. Social benefits in GDP and the logarithm of GDP per capita remain 
highly significant and negative for all dependent variables, while the share of first-time asylum 
applicants and foreigners remains highly insignificant. This finding is highly interesting, as it 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
             countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
foreign          0.289            0.424            1.532            0.168            0.203    
                (0.32)           (0.64)           (1.37)           (0.21)           (0.25)    
ftap            -0.037           -0.004           -0.007           -0.041           -0.027    
               (-1.05)          (-0.21)          (-0.26)          (-1.30)          (-0.64)    
lngdp           -0.082***        -0.052**         -0.067***        -0.033           -0.031*   
               (-3.83)          (-2.33)          (-3.07)          (-1.34)          (-2.08)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
stue             0.015*           0.000            0.011            0.001            0.016*   
                (2.09)           (0.02)           (1.48)           (0.07)           (1.89)    
lngdp           -0.102***        -0.065***        -0.081***        -0.053***        -0.050*** 
               (-7.05)          (-7.01)          (-5.59)          (-6.11)          (-5.18)    
socben          -0.011***        -0.013***        -0.009**         -0.013***        -0.006    
               (-3.12)          (-5.08)          (-2.28)          (-3.99)          (-1.63)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
socben          -0.011***        -0.013***        -0.010**         -0.015***        -0.008**  
               (-3.47)          (-5.40)          (-2.31)          (-6.52)          (-2.21)    
ftap            -0.034           -0.001           -0.016           -0.035           -0.025    
               (-1.30)          (-0.16)          (-0.72)          (-1.37)          (-0.64)    
lngdp           -0.094***        -0.065***        -0.075***        -0.049***        -0.039*** 
               (-5.52)          (-8.52)          (-4.97)         (-11.80)          (-4.33)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ftap            -0.042           -0.001           -0.021           -0.031           -0.030    
               (-1.60)          (-0.17)          (-1.23)          (-1.20)          (-0.84)    
stue             0.010           -0.002            0.007           -0.007            0.008*   
                (1.13)          (-0.24)           (0.80)          (-1.64)           (1.96)    
socben          -0.009**         -0.011***        -0.008*          -0.014***        -0.007**  
               (-2.51)          (-4.26)          (-1.93)          (-5.49)          (-2.81)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis           0.059***         0.008           -0.007            0.001           -0.014    
                (4.45)           (0.71)          (-0.46)           (0.08)          (-1.33)    
lngdp           -0.099***        -0.067***        -0.082***        -0.048***        -0.043*** 
               (-6.08)          (-6.34)          (-4.96)          (-8.62)          (-6.48)    
socben          -0.012***        -0.014***        -0.012**         -0.016***        -0.008*** 
               (-3.19)          (-5.10)          (-2.67)          (-6.47)          (-3.17)    
ftap            -0.037            0.009           -0.002           -0.020           -0.027    
               (-1.28)           (0.67)          (-0.11)          (-0.75)          (-0.73)    
foreign          0.390            1.032            1.800            1.061*           0.253    
                (0.47)           (1.47)           (1.60)           (1.91)           (0.41)    
stue             0.011           -0.002            0.006           -0.008**          0.008**  
                (1.47)          (-0.36)           (0.73)          (-2.19)           (2.14)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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indicates that the state of the economy and its welfare system are more important t0 immigration 
opinion than the share of immigrants in the population. 
As the predictive power of short-term unemployment, first time asylum applicants and share 
of foreigners is limited and circumstantial in its significance, the analysis will continue with a 
more parsimonious model including only social benefits in GDP and GDP p.c. Table 7 contains 
the estimates: jointly, both macro-level variables exhibit only negative coefficients that are 
highly significant except for the impact of social benefits in GDP on the perceived effect of 
immigration on culture. Again, the changes in significance must be taken with caution as they 
are circumstantial.  
Table 7: Final individual- and macro level model on immigration opinion 
In order to an-
swer the second 
research question 
on how the public 
opinion on immigration shifted during the migrant crisis, the coefficient of the crisis dummy 
after controlling for all significant individual- and macro-level variables as well as country-
fixed affects is very informative: being significant and positive for column 1,2 and 4, the coef-
ficients of the crisis dummy suggest that the attitude on immigration did improve as well as the 
perceived impact of immigrants on the economy of the receiving country. Solely the perceived 
impact on culture significantly worsened during the European migrant crisis.  
In conclusion, the estimations highlight that the macro-level variables yield important impli-
cations regarding the public opinion on immigration: GDP p.c. and social benefits to GDP do 
play significant role in contrast to the short-term unemployment, the share of foreigners and the 
share of first-time asylum applicants. These findings emphasize structural rather than cyclical 
components and downplay the relevance of migrant-related figures in shaping immigration 
opinion. They point out that countries with a higher share in foreigners or first-time asylum 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
             countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis           0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.022*          -0.029*   
                (2.51)           (2.55)           (0.01)           (1.88)          (-2.06)    
lngdp           -0.097***        -0.065***        -0.077***        -0.053***        -0.044*** 
               (-5.45)          (-8.54)          (-4.94)          (-8.32)          (-3.60)    
socben          -0.009**         -0.013***        -0.008*          -0.013***        -0.004    
               (-2.25)          (-5.53)          (-1.82)          (-3.50)          (-0.67)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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applicants are neither significantly more averse nor more in favor of immigration. Finally, the 
results indicate that the attitude on immigration (columns 1 and 2) did significantly improve 
during the European migrant crisis, as did the perceived impact of immigrants on the economy. 
Yet, they also suggest that the perceived impact on culture worsened over the course of the 
migrant crisis. 
Impact of the European Migrant Crisis on the Magnitude of the Key Factors 
On an individual-level, the interaction terms between the following individual-level varia-
bles and the crisis dummy were found to be significant: gender, economic insecurity, education 
and age. The results are summarized in Table 8. For gender, the interaction term was significant 
and negative for columns 1 and 4, implying that the attitude of a male individual towards im-
migration from poorer countries and their perceived impact on the economy did worsen over 
the course of the migrant crisis. According to the interaction term of economic insecurity and 
the crisis, individuals experiencing subjective economic insecurity think lesser of immigrants’ 
impact on the culture after the migrant crisis. The opinion of highly educated individuals on 
immigration from the same ethnic group and their perceived impact on the economy did worsen 
compared to pre-crisis levels, whereas the opinion of low educated individuals on the perceived 
impact of immigrants on culture and economy did improve after the crisis. These findings sug-
gest that labor market concerns of low-skill natives might not be the main factor shaping the 
public attitude on immigration in the context of the European migrant crisis, whereas the im-
portance of welfare concerns in form of potential tax implications for high-skill natives become 
stronger. The interaction term for social benefits in GDP is not significant. By contrast, the 
interaction term estimate for GDP per capita. is significant and positive for columns 1, 3 and 5. 
This finding suggests that the negative impact of an increase in GDP per capita is attenuated 
after the peak of the crisis. Strikingly, after adding the interaction term, the main effect of the 
crisis dummy turned negative for all dependent variables, only being significant for columns 1 
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(𝜃 =  −0.827), 3 (𝜃 =  −0.943) and 5 (𝜃 =  −0.963). Considering that the coefficients of the 
interaction terms for column 1, 3 and 5 were 𝜃 =  0.0849, 𝜃 =  0.092  and 𝜃 =  0.0914, while  
Table 8: Change in the magnitude of explanatory variables during the Euro-
pean migrant crisis (significant estimates) 
the average level 
of GDP p.c. is 
10.15, it becomes 
evident that all 
countries with a 




tion from poor 
countries and 
their perceived 
impact on culture 
over the crisis in 
contrast to coun-
tries with a GDP 
p.c. below average.  
In conclusion, the findings reveal that the European migrant crisis did alter the magnitude 
by which age, gender, economic insecurity, education and GDP p.c. affect the public opinion 
on immigration Ultimately, the main effect of the crisis dummy and the coefficient of the inter-
action term with GDP p.c. indicate that for countries with a GDP below average the opinion on 
immigrants worsened during the migrant crisis, while it improved for countries with a GDP 
above average. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
              countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
highedcrisis      0.003           -0.016*          -0.002           -0.023**          0.017    
                 (0.25)          (-1.95)          (-0.24)          (-2.44)           (1.57)    
medium edu.       0.049***         0.075***         0.069***         0.065***         0.058*** 
                 (6.09)           (9.19)           (7.78)           (7.65)           (6.38)    
high edu.         0.165***         0.173***         0.191***         0.197***         0.147*** 
                (11.26)          (13.88)          (14.34)          (14.78)           (8.96)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lowedcrisis       0.021            0.019            0.016            0.028*           0.026**  
                 (1.06)           (1.06)           (0.85)           (2.11)           (2.74)    
medium edu.       0.059***         0.083***         0.076***         0.078***         0.069*** 
                 (4.70)           (7.32)           (5.84)           (6.31)           (6.84)    
high edu.     0.176***         0.173***         0.197***         0.199***         0.166*** 
                (12.39)          (13.00)          (14.06)          (14.24)          (11.96)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
sexcrisis        -0.015*          -0.009           -0.010           -0.022**         -0.009    
                (-1.76)          (-1.21)          (-1.24)          (-2.79)          (-1.28)    
sex              -0.011           -0.005           -0.006            0.031***        -0.019**  
                (-1.32)          (-0.63)          (-0.55)           (3.38)          (-2.60)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ecincrisis       -0.017            0.008           -0.019           -0.005           -0.029*   
                (-0.91)           (0.54)          (-1.38)          (-0.24)          (-1.88)    
ecoinsec         -0.044***        -0.072***        -0.052***        -0.064***        -0.036**  
                (-3.05)          (-7.80)          (-5.31)          (-4.18)          (-2.44)    
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
youngcrisis       0.135***         0.056***         0.115***        -0.007            0.019    
                 (8.49)           (3.81)           (5.96)          (-0.38)           (1.22)    
32-43             0.086***         0.020            0.067***        -0.018            0.014    
                 (6.67)           (1.52)           (4.13)          (-1.25)           (1.10)    
44-55             0.068***         0.014            0.049***        -0.020            0.010    
                 (8.38)           (1.26)           (4.18)          (-1.69)           (1.05)    
56-67             0.035***         0.011            0.033***        -0.016*           0.001    
                 (4.72)           (1.30)           (4.02)          (-1.97)           (0.22)    
68-100            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
oldcrisis        -0.135***        -0.056***        -0.115***         0.007           -0.019    
                (-8.49)          (-3.81)          (-5.96)           (0.38)          (-1.22)    
32-43 y~s        -0.049***        -0.036***        -0.049***        -0.011           -0.005    
                (-6.68)          (-5.76)          (-6.81)          (-1.34)          (-0.68)    
44-55 y~s        -0.067***        -0.042***        -0.067***        -0.013           -0.008    
                (-5.57)          (-5.61)          (-5.79)          (-1.19)          (-0.69)    
56-67 y~s        -0.100***        -0.046***        -0.082***        -0.009           -0.017    
                (-7.04)          (-4.26)          (-5.41)          (-0.57)          (-1.25)    
68-100 ~s         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis           -0.827***        -0.253           -0.943***        -0.282           -0.963*** 
                (-3.20)          (-1.35)          (-3.39)          (-1.02)          (-3.17)    
gdpcrisis         0.085***         0.027            0.092***         0.030            0.091*** 
                 (3.40)           (1.50)           (3.46)           (1.10)           (3.11)    
lngdp            -0.193***        -0.096***        -0.182***        -0.086**         -0.148*** 
                (-5.34)          (-3.72)          (-4.69)          (-2.51)          (-3.83)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




This paper examined four rounds of ESS data from 2012 until 2018 in order to explore how the 
European migrant crisis affected the public opinion on immigration and its key determining 
factors. The relevance of this paper is emphasized by future outlooks on migration predicting 
that the number of immigrants and asylum seekers arriving in Europe is more likely to increase 
in the future, rather than decrease (IOM, 2018). 
The findings in chapter 5 contain interesting information on the three research questions. 
First, the data reconfirmed existing literature showing, on an individual-level, that understand-
ing differences among countries’ perceptions over immigrants entail understanding the compo-
sition of their population in terms of socioeconomic variables but also in terms of economic 
fears and cultural values. Economic fears are mostly driven by the fear of labor market compe-
tition on the low-skill job market and welfare concerns in form of tax implications, whereas 
cultural values that negatively affect immigration opinion cement themselves in the form of 
authoritarian values rather than religiousness. On a macro-level, the share of foreigners or asy-
lum applicants in a country is irrelevant in shaping immigration opinion, while the economic 
situation and the extent of the social welfare state are key factors. Second, it becomes evident 
that even after controlling for individual- and macro level determinants, as well as country-
fixed affects, the time dimension, capturing the shock of the European migrant crisis, exhibits 
a significantly positive sign for the public opinion on immigration, except for the perceived 
impact of immigrants on culture. These results are interesting in that they indicate people be-
coming increasingly more positive towards immigrants, yet the cultural differences leave a 
mark on their opinion. Finally, the model also reveals that changes in magnitude of certain 
variables occurred during the migrant crisis, showing that the magnitude of age, gender, eco-
nomic insecurity and education and impact of GDP p.c. were altered. Seemingly, individuals 
that are more likely to compete with immigrants on the labor market or for a fixed supply of 
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welfare payments such as elderly, male or economically troubled individuals have been, on 
average, more affected in their opinion on immigration by the European migrant crisis. How-
ever, it is astounding to find that low-skilled individuals improved their opinion on immigration 
over the course of the crisis, while the opinion of high-skilled individuals worsened. This find-
ing implies that it might be welfare concerns in form of potential tax implications that became 
more important because of the crisis. This explanation is supported on a macro-level, with the 
coefficient of social benefits in GDP being significantly negative. As outlined in chapter 3, 
immigrants, even in extreme scenarios such as the migrant crisis in Europe, are likely to provide 
a boost to GDP and other economic variables in the long-run. Hence, those arguments should 
be emphasized much stronger to address welfare and by that also immigration concerns. 
There are a number of limitations to this analysis. To begin with, the estimations of the 
macro-level regression coefficients are circumstantial as they differ between adding one varia-
ble at a time and multiple variables. Therefore, they must be interpreted with caution. While a 
simple internal validity check has been conducted (Appendix A), which supports the main find-
ings of chapter 5, future research is advised to address the external validity of the model using 
alternative data sources. Finally, the model offers insights on the relationship between the in-
dependent variables and immigration opinion, yet the causality of their relationship has not 
been inferred.  
This paper offers several avenues for future research. One interesting avenue has been intro-
duced by Hatton (2017), suggesting that salience is highly relevant for shaping the attitude 
towards immigration. Accordingly, including a variable capturing the salience of immigration 
in form of media coverage on immigration into the regression model estimated in this paper 
might be very conclusive.  
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The finding that the overall opinion on immigration improved stands in contrast to a media 
narrative (Hatton, 2017) that gradually replaced a sympathetic and empathetic response to the 
refugee crisis with suspicion and hostility towards asylum seekers and immigrants (Georgiou 
& Zaborowski, 2017), sometimes even promoting hate speech and Euroscepticism (Harteveld, 
Schaper, De Lange, & Van Der Brug, 2018). Hence, the results of this paper give hope that 
Europe is not going to break under the challenge that immigration does pose and will continue 
posing in the future. Especially because immigrants will be vital in the future to advance the 




Apap, J., Radjenovic, A., & Dobreva, A. (2019). The migration issue. In EU policies - 
Delivering for citizens. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2019
)635542 
Boeri, T. (2010). Immigration to the Land of Redistribution. Economica, 77(308), 651–687. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2010.00859.x 
Borjas, G. (2013). The Analytics of the Wage Effect of Immigration. IZA Journal of 
Migration, 2(22), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9039-2-22 
Borjas, G. J. (2003). The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the impact 
of immigration on the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1335–
1374. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552810 
Brücker, H., & Jahn, E. J. (2011). Migration and Wage-setting: Reassessing the Labor Market 
Effects of Migration. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(2), 286–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01634.x 
Brücker, H., Rother, N., & Schupp, J. (2016). IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten: 
Überblick und erste Ergebnisse. Retrieved from 
https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb29-
iab-bamf-soep-befragung-gefluechtete.html?nn=1362958 
Card, D. (1990). The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 43(2), 245. https://doi.org/10.2307/2523702 
Card, D., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2012). Immigration, wages, and compositional 
amenities. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 78–119. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01051.x 
Citrin, J., & Wong, C. (1997). Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform : The Role of 
Economic Motivations. The Journal of Politics, 59(3), 858–881. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2998640 
Clemens, M. A., & Hunt, J. (2017). The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: 
Reconciling Conflicting Results. In NBER Working Paper Series (Vol. 72). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793918824597 
Connor, P. (2016). Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015. 
Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-
surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/ 
de Vries, C., & Hoffmann, I. (2016). Fear not Values: Public opinion and the populist vote in 
Europe. In Eupinions. Retrieved from https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_eupinions_Fear_Study_2016_ENG.pdf 
Dumont, J., Liebig, T., Peschner, J., Tanay, F., & Xenogiani, T. (2016). How are refugees 
faring on the labour market in Europe ?: A first evaluation based on the 2014 EU 
Labour Force Survey ad hoc module (No. 1). https://doi.org/10.2767/350756 
Dustmann, C., Glitz, A., & Frattini, T. (2008). The labour market impact of immigration. 




Dustmann, C., Hatton, T., & Preston, I. (2005). The Labour Market Effects of Immigration. 
The Economic Journal, 115(507), F297–F299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2005.01036.x 
Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. P. (2007). The B . E . Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 
Advances Immigration Immigration ∗. 7(1). 
Facchini, G., & Mayda, A. M. (2009). Does the welfare state affect individual attitudes 
toward immigrants? Evidence across countries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
91(2), 295–314. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.2.295 
Georgiou, M., & Zaborowski, R. (2017). Media coverage of the “refugee crisis”: A cross-
European perspective. https://doi.org/10.1002/etc.5620091208 
Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2007). Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward 
Immigration in Europe. International Organization, 61(02), 399–442. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070142 
Harteveld, E., Schaper, J., De Lange, S. L., & Van Der Brug, W. (2018). Blaming Brussels? 
The Impact of (News about) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes towards the EU and 
National Politics. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 157–177. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12664 
Hatton, T. J. (2016). Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe. Economic 
Policy, 31(86), 205–246. https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiw004 
Hatton, T. J. (2017). Public Opinion on Immigration in Europe: Preference versus Salience. 
IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 10838, (10838), 1–28. 
Hudson, L. (2018). Syrian Refugees in Europe: Migration Dynamics and Political Challenges. 
New England Journal of Public Policy, 30(2), 9. 
IMF. (2016). The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges. In Staff Discussion Notes 
(Vol. 16). https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513552590.006 
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-
Nots and Cultural Backlash. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659 
IOM. (2018). WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018. Geneva: International Organization of 
Migration. 
Kancs, D., & Lecca, P. (2018). Long-term social, economic and fiscal effects of immigration 
into the EU: The role of the integration policy. World Economy, 41(10), 2599–2630. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12637 
Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., & Hyunung Mo, C. (2013). Economic Explanations for 
Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact. 
American Journal of Political Science, 57(4), 391–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps 
Manevska, K., & Achterberg, P. (2013). Immigration and perceived ethnic threat: Cultural 
capital and economic explanations. European Sociological Review, 29(3), 437–449. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcr085 
National Research Council. (1997). The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and 
28 
 
Fiscal Effects of Immigration (J. P. Smith & B. Edmonston, eds.). 
https://doi.org/10.17226/5779 
Ortega, F., & Polavieja, J. G. (2012). Labor-market exposure as a determinant of attitudes 
toward immigration. Labour Economics, 19(3), 298–311. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2012.02.004 
Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Peri, G. (2012). Rethinking the effect of immigration on wages. Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 49(February), 35–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1142/9781 
Poutvaara, P., & Wech, D. (2016). Integrating Refugees into the Labor Market - A 
Comparison of Europe and the United States (Vol. 4). 
Ruiz, I., & Vargas-Silva, C. (2018). Differences in labour market outcomes between natives, 
refugees and other migrants in the UK. Journal of Economic Geography, 18(4), 855–
885. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lby027 
Rustenbach, E. (2010). International Travel & Tourism. The International Migration Review, 
44(1), 53–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.l747-7379.2009.00798.x 
Scheve, K., & Slaughter, M. (2001). Labor-Market Competition and Individual Preferences 
Over Immigration Policy. In NBER Working Paper Series (Vol. 6946). 
Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, 
interests and information. British Journal of Political Science, 37(3), 477–504. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123407000257 





Appendix A: Internal Validity Check. Heterogeneity across Socioeconomic Groups 
As the estimates for the macro-level variables are circumstantial to the macro-level variables 
included with them, it is likely to assume that the macro-level factors shaping the public opinion 
on immigration might alter across different socioeconomic groups. In order to examine whether 
macro-level variables affect different socioeconomic groups differently, the following section 
aims on reconfirming the internal validity of the model applied in chapter 5 by analyzing 
whether the explanatory power of macro-level variables is changing across different types of 
individuals. Following Hatton (2016), the sample population was divided into several socioec-
onomic groups which were entered in the regression equation in form of interaction terms with 
the two significant macro-level variables, GDP per capita and social benefits in GDP. The fol-
lowing regression equation was estimated: 
𝑌𝑖𝑐 =  𝑋𝑖𝑐𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝛽 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑍𝑖𝑐𝛿 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝜂 +  𝜖𝑖𝑐                   (4) 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑐is comprised of the two main significant macro-level variables GDP per capita and 
social benefits in GDP. 𝑋𝑖𝑐 includes all individual-level variables from the previous chapter. 
𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑍𝑖𝑐 consists of interaction terms between the macro-level variables and the individual-level 
variables that were the most significant (Hatton 2016): education (low and high education), 
income (top or bottom income), gender, labor market participation and authoritarian values 
(traditions and rules). The estimates of 𝛿 are summarized in Table 9. 
The interaction term of high education with GDP p.c. is significant and positive for the per-
ceived impact on culture, economy and the opinion on immigration from poor countries. The 
main effect of GDP p.c. remains highly significant and negative in all columns, implying that 
higher levels of education mitigate the negative main effect of an increase in GDP p.c. for col-
umn 1, 4 and 5. The only significant coefficient for the interaction between high education and 
social benefits in GDP is for column 5, indicating that higher education attenuates the negative 
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impact of social benefits in GDP on the perceived impact on the economy. The interaction 
coefficient of social benefits in GDP and low education is entirely insignificant, while the in-
teraction for GDP p.c. is significant and negative for the perceived impact on culture and the 
economy. In conclusion, higher levels of education slightly mitigate the negative impact of 
GDP p.c. on the opinion on immigration, while low levels of education increase the magnitude 
of GDP p.c. This finding comes intuitive, as it is low-skilled workers who will mostly compete 
with the immigrants on the labor market and therefore fear economic consequences. Strikingly, 
the coefficients of the interaction terms including low and high income were not significant at 
all. Seemingly, the magnitude of the impact GDP p.c. and social benefits in GDP are having on 
the overall opinion on immigration appears to be not significantly different among individuals 
at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution. By contrast, being male has a signifi-
cantly negative impact on the perception of immigrants from poorer countries in interaction 
with GDP p.c., indicating that an increase in a country’s GDP does affect the male opinion on 
immigration from poor countries significantly stronger than the female opinion. 
While the economic fear hypothesis strongly suggests otherwise, being a labor market par-
ticipant does not significantly alter the magnitude of GDP p.c. and social benefits in GDP. Fi-
nally, the interaction term between favoring traditions and social benefits in GDP is negative 
and significant for columns 1 to 3, while the interaction term with GDP p.c. is negative and 
significant for columns 1,3 and 5. Those findings suggest that the effect of an increase in social 
benefits in GDP and GDP p.c. is increasingly more negative among individuals with a stronger 
tendency towards authoritarianism, implying that more authoritarian individuals have a lesser 
opinion on immigration. This finding is supported by the interaction term between the im-
portance of rules and the macro-level variables, with the coefficient related to GDP p.c. being 
slightly significant and negative for the attitude towards migrants from poorer countries.  
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In conclusion, the results confirm the idea that the magnitude of the macro-level variables 
does vary among certain socioeconomic groups. Moreover, they also reconfirm the results from 
chapter 5. Furthermore, they underline the internal validity of the model: despite a variation in 
magnitude, the relationship between GDP p.c. and social benefits in GDP with the dependent 
remains negative across different socioeconomic groups. 
Table 9: Macro-level heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
              countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.022*          -0.029*   
                 (2.50)           (2.56)           (0.00)           (1.86)          (-2.08)    
lngdp            -0.103***        -0.064***        -0.081***        -0.058***        -0.053*** 
                (-5.76)          (-9.29)          (-5.33)          (-8.88)          (-3.92)    
socben           -0.010**         -0.013***        -0.009*          -0.014***        -0.004    
                (-2.44)          (-5.47)          (-2.00)          (-3.85)          (-0.62)    
High edu /        0.024*          -0.004            0.016            0.019*           0.034*** 
GDP              (2.09)          (-0.36)           (1.65)           (1.78)           (3.77)    
High edu/         0.002            0.001            0.002            0.004**         -0.001    
socben           (1.20)           (0.39)           (1.44)           (2.66)          (-0.49)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.040**          0.022**         -0.000            0.022*          -0.030*   
                 (2.48)           (2.53)          (-0.01)           (1.81)          (-2.09)    
lngdp            -0.088***        -0.060***        -0.069***        -0.038***        -0.029**  
                (-4.89)          (-5.03)          (-3.93)          (-4.73)          (-2.62)    
socben           -0.009*          -0.013***        -0.008           -0.012***        -0.004    
                (-2.03)          (-5.44)          (-1.68)          (-3.20)          (-0.58)    
Low edu/         -0.019           -0.013           -0.018           -0.031**         -0.034**  
GDP             (-1.45)          (-0.87)          (-1.26)          (-2.16)          (-2.21)    
Low edu/         -0.001           -0.000           -0.001           -0.002           -0.001    
socben          (-0.77)          (-0.15)          (-0.54)          (-0.74)          (-0.47)     
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.023*          -0.029*   
                 (2.51)           (2.55)           (0.01)           (1.88)          (-2.06)    
lngdp            -0.096***        -0.065***        -0.076***        -0.054***        -0.044*** 
                (-5.64)          (-8.00)          (-5.01)          (-8.76)          (-3.58)    
socben           -0.009**         -0.013***        -0.008*          -0.013***        -0.004    
                (-2.13)          (-5.67)          (-1.80)          (-3.41)          (-0.65)    
Low income/      -0.001            0.001            0.000           -0.000           -0.000    
socben          (-0.73)           (0.63)           (0.17)          (-0.16)          (-0.75)    
Low income/      -0.002           -0.001           -0.007            0.008            0.003    
GDP             (-0.16)          (-0.06)          (-0.61)           (0.82)           (0.34)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.022*          -0.029*   
                 (2.50)           (2.56)           (0.00)           (1.86)          (-2.07)    
lngdp            -0.097***        -0.064***        -0.078***        -0.053***        -0.045*** 
                (-5.13)          (-9.01)          (-4.78)          (-7.62)          (-3.62)    
socben           -0.010**         -0.013***        -0.009*          -0.013***        -0.004    
                (-2.37)          (-5.46)          (-1.91)          (-3.64)          (-0.69)    
High income/      0.002            0.000            0.002            0.002            0.001    
socben           (1.18)           (0.08)           (1.12)           (1.19)           (0.54)    
High income       0.001           -0.005            0.003            0.003            0.004    
GDP              (0.05)          (-0.45)           (0.22)           (0.23)           (0.32))   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.022*          -0.029*   
                 (2.52)           (2.55)           (0.01)           (1.88)          (-2.06)    
lngdp            -0.090***        -0.062***        -0.074***        -0.055***        -0.044*** 
                (-4.90)          (-7.32)          (-4.26)          (-6.97)          (-3.27)    
socben           -0.009**         -0.013***        -0.008*          -0.013***        -0.005    
                (-2.24)          (-5.29)          (-1.80)          (-3.49)          (-0.77)    
Gender/          -0.000           -0.000            0.000            0.000            0.001    
socben          (-0.06)          (-0.15)           (0.12)           (0.12)           (1.10)    
Gender/          -0.015**         -0.006           -0.007            0.005           -0.000    




crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.022*          -0.029*   
                 (2.51)           (2.55)           (0.01)           (1.88)          (-2.06)    
lngdp            -0.097***        -0.059***        -0.073***        -0.054***        -0.050*** 
                (-4.89)          (-7.20)          (-4.82)          (-6.15)          (-3.65)    
socben           -0.010**         -0.012***        -0.009*          -0.013***        -0.005    
                (-2.40)          (-5.33)          (-1.93)          (-3.52)          (-0.74)    
Labor Market      0.001           -0.011           -0.006            0.002            0.011    
Part./GDP        (0.10)          (-1.31)          (-0.86)           (0.24)           (1.45)    
Labor Market      0.001           -0.001            0.001           -0.001            0.001    
Part/socben      (1.09)          (-0.82)           (0.70)          (-0.45)           (0.67)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.023*          -0.029*   
                 (2.54)           (2.57)           (0.03)           (1.88)          (-2.05)    
lngdp            -0.066***        -0.055***        -0.049***        -0.046**         -0.019    
                (-3.67)          (-5.27)          (-2.94)          (-2.48)          (-1.55)    
socben           -0.006           -0.010***        -0.005           -0.010**         -0.002    
                (-1.40)          (-3.92)          (-1.00)          (-2.56)          (-0.39)    
Tradition/       -0.001**         -0.001**         -0.001**         -0.001           -0.000    
Socben          (-2.55)          (-2.38)          (-2.49)          (-1.70)          (-1.05)    
Tradition/       -0.008*          -0.003           -0.007**         -0.002           -0.006**  
GDP             (-2.07)          (-0.97)          (-2.22)          (-0.45)          (-2.75)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis            0.041**          0.023**          0.000            0.023*          -0.029*   
                 (2.55)           (2.57)           (0.03)           (1.88)          (-2.07)    
lngdp            -0.069***        -0.057***        -0.052***        -0.051***        -0.039*** 
                (-3.66)          (-4.51)          (-3.06)          (-5.67)          (-3.27)    
socben           -0.007           -0.012***        -0.007           -0.011**         -0.004    
                (-1.39)          (-5.03)          (-1.38)          (-2.73)          (-0.54)    
Rules/           -0.001           -0.000           -0.000           -0.000           -0.000    
Socben          (-1.65)          (-0.75)          (-0.69)          (-1.09)          (-0.25)    
Rules/           -0.009*          -0.002           -0.008           -0.000           -0.001    
GDP             (-2.00)          (-0.75)          (-1.59)          (-0.15)          (-0.45)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 




Appendix B: Variables and Coding used in the Analysis 
Table 10: Summary of variables used in the model 
Variable Topic Scale and Source 
Dependent Variables 
patmfpc Positive attitude towards immigrants 
from poor countries outside of Europe 
ESS 6 – 9: (1) = Yes, (0) = No 
Based on impcntr (1 – 2 =  Yes, 3 – 4 = 
No) 
patmfse Positive attitude towards immigrants 
from the same ethnic group 
ESS 6 – 9: (1) = Yes, (0) = No 
Based on imsmetn (1 – 2 =  Yes, 3 – 4 
= No) 
patmfde Positive attitude towards immigrants 
from a different ethnic group 
ESS 6 – 9: (1) = Yes, (0) = No 
Based on impcntr (1 – 2 =  Yes, 3 – 4 = 
No) 
imp_eco Perceived impact of immigrants on the 
economy of the receiving country 
ESS 6 – 9. Based on imbgeco: Scale 
from (0) = “Bad for economy” to (10) = 
“Good for economy”.  
(1) = Positive if imbgeco < 5, (0) = 
Negative if imbgeco >= 5 
imp_cult Perceived impact of immigrants on the 
culture of the receiving country 
ESS 6 – 9. Based on imueclt: Scale 
from (0) = “Cultural life undermined” 
to (10) = “Cultural life enriched”.  
(1) = Positive if imueclt < 5, (0) = Neg-
ative if imueclt >= 5 
Individual-level Explanatory Variables 
crisis Indicates if observation is from before 
or after the peak of the European mi-
grant crisis 
ESS 6 – 9: Based on essround. 
(1) = “After crisis” if essround >= 8, (0) 
= “Before crisis” if essround < 8 
agebrack Age of individual distributed into 5 age 
brackets that each comprise 20% of the 
entire population 
ESS 6 – 9: based on agea. (1) if agea 
[15 -31], (2) if agea [32 – 43], (3) if 
agea [44 – 55], (4) if agea [56 – 67], (5) 
if agea [68 – 100] 
sex Male or non-male ESS 6 – 9: based on gndr, (1) if male, 
(0) non-male 
brncntr Individual born in country ESS 6 – 9: (1) = Yes, (0) = No 
ethminor Individual belongs to an ethnic minor-
ity 
ESS 6 – 9: (1) = Yes, (0) = No 
edulvla Highest degree an individual obtained ESS 6 – 9: based on eisced (highest ed-
ucation level on ISCED scale). (1) if 
eisced [1,2] “low”, (2) if  [3,5] “mid-
dle”, (3) if eisced [6,7] “high” 
ecoinsec Self-perceived economic insecurity ESS 6 – 9: based on hincfel. (1) if 
hincfel >= 3 (Feeling about household’s 
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income nowadays difficult or very dif-
ficult) 
lbrforce Individual participates in the labor 
force (either being employed or unem-
ployed but seeking employment) 
ESS 6 – 9: based on pdwrk and uempla. 
(1) if either pdwrk = 1 or uempla = 1 
hinctnta Household’s total net income, all 
sources. 
ESS 6 – 9: scale divided into deciles 
from 1 to 10. 
religious Individual is religious. ESS 6 – 9: based on rlgdgr (scale from 
1 to 10). (1) if rlgdgr > 5 
safe Individual importance of feeling safe ESS 6 – 9: based on impsafe. Scale 
from 1 (not important) to 6 (very im-
portant). 
strgov Importance of having a strong govern-
ment. 
ESS 6 – 9: based on impstrgv. Scale 
from 1 (not important) to 6 (very im-
portant). 
trad Importance of following traditions and 
customs. 
ESS 6 – 9: based on imptrad. Scale 
from 1 (not important) to 6 (very im-
portant). 
rule Importance of following rules. ESS 6 – 9: Based on imprule. Scale 
from 1 (not important) to 6 (very im-
portant). 
lrscale Self-placement on the left right scale. ESS 6 – 9: Scale from 0 (left) to 10 
(right). 
Macro-level Explanatory Variables 
socben Social benefits to households, In cash / 
In kind, % of GDP, 20012 – 2018 
OECD database 
lngdp Logarithm of the annual real GDP per 
capita, per country 2012 – 2018  
Eurostat database 
ftap Share of first-time asylum applicants in 
population per country, 2012 – 2018 
Eurostat database 
foreign Share of foreigners in population per 
country, 2012 – 2018 
Eurostat database 





Appendix C: Country-fixed Effects 
Table 4: Country-fixed effects at an individual level 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
              countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BE                0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
CH               -0.003            0.067***         0.020***         0.197***         0.013*** 
                (-1.07)          (25.48)           (5.74)          (70.45)           (4.52)    
CZ               -0.309***        -0.318***        -0.326***        -0.071***        -0.281*** 
               (-77.32)        (-134.56)         (-76.56)         (-17.50)         (-68.56)    
DE                0.038***         0.105***         0.075***         0.133***         0.000    
                (11.84)          (38.43)          (24.35)          (34.15)           (0.04)    
EE               -0.240***        -0.037***        -0.148***         0.022***        -0.062*** 
               (-41.09)          (-7.85)         (-24.99)           (4.50)         (-14.32)    
ES                0.011**         -0.067***         0.018***         0.137***         0.087*** 
                 (2.12)         (-12.69)           (2.84)          (21.42)          (15.21)    
FI               -0.191***        -0.074***        -0.128***         0.097***         0.145*** 
               (-59.87)         (-25.27)         (-41.21)          (31.14)          (44.02)    
FR               -0.022***         0.000            0.007***         0.010***        -0.092*** 
                (-9.48)           (0.20)           (2.70)           (3.38)         (-38.18)    
GB               -0.064***        -0.071***         0.005            0.078***        -0.079*** 
               (-22.29)         (-30.26)           (1.60)          (29.68)         (-39.10)    
HU               -0.401***        -0.207***        -0.358***        -0.097***        -0.091*** 
               (-72.05)         (-58.80)         (-64.75)         (-17.70)         (-14.36)    
IE               -0.012***        -0.058***         0.004            0.102***         0.011*** 
                (-3.33)         (-19.09)           (0.88)          (35.01)           (3.95)    
LT               -0.199***        -0.103***        -0.099***         0.081***        -0.125*** 
               (-44.04)         (-28.42)         (-23.03)          (21.69)         (-27.68)    
NL               -0.025***        -0.038***         0.049***         0.084***         0.041*** 
               (-10.37)         (-18.21)          (18.90)          (34.63)          (19.73)    
NO                0.094***         0.054***         0.119***         0.142***        -0.009*** 
                (30.82)          (20.14)          (33.61)          (57.12)          (-3.34)    
PL                0.001           -0.021***        -0.025***         0.140***         0.102*** 
                 (0.11)          (-4.03)          (-4.00)          (26.74)          (15.87)    
PT               -0.023***        -0.062***        -0.015**          0.102***         0.022*** 
                (-3.41)         (-10.69)          (-2.44)          (16.39)           (3.42)    
SE                0.245***         0.140***         0.249***         0.102***         0.100*** 
                (64.90)          (39.94)          (56.15)          (25.67)          (21.34)    
SI               -0.041***         0.013***        -0.002           -0.054***        -0.068*** 
                (-9.29)           (5.23)          (-0.43)         (-16.01)         (-17.29)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 




Appendix D: Regression Output of Interaction Terms 
Table 11: Change in the magnitude of explanatory variables during the European migrant crisis 
(all estimates) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               (1) Poor         (2) Same    (3) Different      (4) Improve       (5) Enrich    
              countries        ethnicity        ethnicity          economy          culture    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lrcrisis         -0.005           -0.000           -0.004           -0.003           -0.004    
                (-1.45)          (-0.10)          (-1.01)          (-1.68)          (-1.48)    
lrscale          -0.025***        -0.011***        -0.023***        -0.011***        -0.014*** 
                (-5.65)          (-3.92)          (-5.61)          (-2.94)          (-3.17)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
highedcrisis      0.003           -0.016*          -0.002           -0.023**          0.017    
                 (0.25)          (-1.95)          (-0.24)          (-2.44)           (1.57)    
low edu.    0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
medium edu.       0.049***         0.075***         0.069***         0.065***         0.058*** 
                 (6.09)           (9.19)           (7.78)           (7.65)           (6.38)    
high edu.         0.165***         0.173***         0.191***         0.197***         0.147*** 
                (11.26)          (13.88)          (14.34)          (14.78)           (8.96)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lowedcrisis       0.021            0.019            0.016            0.028*           0.026**  
                 (1.06)           (1.06)           (0.85)           (2.11)           (2.74)    
low edu.    0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
medium edu.       0.059***         0.083***         0.076***         0.078***         0.069*** 
                 (4.70)           (7.32)           (5.84)           (6.31)           (6.84)    
high edu.     0.176***         0.173***         0.197***         0.199***         0.166*** 
                (12.39)          (13.00)          (14.06)          (14.24)          (11.96)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
sexcrisis        -0.015*          -0.009           -0.010           -0.022**         -0.009    
                (-1.76)          (-1.21)          (-1.24)          (-2.79)          (-1.28)    
sex              -0.011           -0.005           -0.006            0.031***        -0.019**  
                (-1.32)          (-0.63)          (-0.55)           (3.38)          (-2.60)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
relcrisis        -0.009           -0.015           -0.022           -0.013           -0.003    
                (-0.56)          (-0.97)          (-1.12)          (-1.60)          (-0.27)    
religious         0.049***         0.029***         0.042***         0.055***         0.042*** 
                 (4.67)           (3.81)           (4.75)           (7.14)           (5.61)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rulecrisis       -0.004            0.003           -0.004            0.002           -0.001    
                (-0.84)           (1.02)          (-1.01)           (0.66)          (-0.50)    
1.rule            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
2.rule           -0.021***        -0.000           -0.011*           0.009            0.004    
                (-2.94)          (-0.04)          (-1.75)           (1.40)           (0.51)    
3.rule           -0.030***        -0.012           -0.023**          0.006            0.006    
                (-3.60)          (-1.30)          (-2.47)           (0.75)           (0.65)    
4.rule           -0.040***        -0.027**         -0.035**         -0.003           -0.002    
                (-3.79)          (-2.14)          (-2.70)          (-0.35)          (-0.21)    
5.rule           -0.047***        -0.037***        -0.043***        -0.008           -0.010    
                (-3.81)          (-3.04)          (-3.31)          (-0.82)          (-0.77)    
6.rule           -0.045**         -0.053***        -0.040*          -0.026*          -0.026*   
                (-2.64)          (-3.29)          (-2.06)          (-1.79)          (-1.92)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
tradcrisis       -0.006            0.001           -0.007           -0.002           -0.008    
                (-1.19)           (0.22)          (-1.45)          (-0.49)          (-1.63)    
1.trad            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
2.trad           -0.007            0.001            0.005            0.004            0.012    
                (-0.73)           (0.10)           (0.51)           (0.41)           (1.68)    
3.trad           -0.023           -0.000            0.000           -0.003            0.014    
                (-1.59)          (-0.01)           (0.03)          (-0.33)           (1.28)    
4.trad           -0.030*          -0.013           -0.010           -0.003            0.013    
                (-1.80)          (-0.98)          (-0.61)          (-0.29)           (1.17)    
5.trad           -0.041**         -0.020           -0.024           -0.023*          -0.008    
                (-2.39)          (-1.28)          (-1.29)          (-2.03)          (-0.57)    
6.trad           -0.047**         -0.032**         -0.030           -0.036***        -0.028    
                (-2.75)          (-2.54)          (-1.58)          (-3.19)          (-1.67)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ecincrisis       -0.017            0.008           -0.019           -0.005           -0.029*   
                (-0.91)           (0.54)          (-1.38)          (-0.24)          (-1.88)    
ecoinsec         -0.044***        -0.072***        -0.052***        -0.064***        -0.036**  
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                (-3.05)          (-7.80)          (-5.31)          (-4.18)          (-2.44)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
youngcrisis       0.135***         0.056***         0.115***        -0.007            0.019    
                 (8.49)           (3.81)           (5.96)          (-0.38)           (1.22)    
15-31             0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
32-43             0.086***         0.020            0.067***        -0.018            0.014    
                 (6.67)           (1.52)           (4.13)          (-1.25)           (1.10)    
44-55             0.068***         0.014            0.049***        -0.020            0.010    
                 (8.38)           (1.26)           (4.18)          (-1.69)           (1.05)    
56-67             0.035***         0.011            0.033***        -0.016*           0.001    
                 (4.72)           (1.30)           (4.02)          (-1.97)           (0.22)    
68-100            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
oldcrisis        -0.135***        -0.056***        -0.115***         0.007           -0.019    
                (-8.49)          (-3.81)          (-5.96)           (0.38)          (-1.22)    
15-31 y~s         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)    
32-43 y~s        -0.049***        -0.036***        -0.049***        -0.011           -0.005    
                (-6.68)          (-5.76)          (-6.81)          (-1.34)          (-0.68)    
44-55 y~s        -0.067***        -0.042***        -0.067***        -0.013           -0.008    
                (-5.57)          (-5.61)          (-5.79)          (-1.19)          (-0.69)    
56-67 y~s        -0.100***        -0.046***        -0.082***        -0.009           -0.017    
                (-7.04)          (-4.26)          (-5.41)          (-0.57)          (-1.25)    
68-100 ~s         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000    
                    (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)              (.)   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
crisis           -0.827***        -0.253           -0.943***        -0.282           -0.963*** 
                (-3.20)          (-1.35)          (-3.39)          (-1.02)          (-3.17)    
gdpcrisis         0.085***         0.027            0.092***         0.030            0.091*** 
                 (3.40)           (1.50)           (3.46)           (1.10)           (3.11)    
lngdp            -0.193***        -0.096***        -0.182***        -0.086**         -0.148*** 
                (-5.34)          (-3.72)          (-4.69)          (-2.51)          (-3.83)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
socrisis          0.003            0.001            0.003            0.002            0.001    
                 (1.22)           (1.44)           (1.18)           (1.10)           (0.66)    
socben           -0.013**         -0.014***        -0.012*          -0.015***        -0.006    
                (-2.43)          (-4.77)          (-1.89)          (-3.99)          (-0.93)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N             93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000        93756.000    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: ESS data file round 6 - 9 





Appendix E: Test Statistics 
Before the five models were estimated, the use of a country-fixed effects regression was con-
firmed by the test-results from a Hausman test. Moreover, heteroskedasticity was found for all 
five model, using a modified Wald test. Therefore, the regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors. The test-statistic and p-values (in parentheses) are tabulated in Table 10. 
































































Appendix F: Data behind the Macro-level Variables 
Table 13: GDP per capita 
Country 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Belgium 33,640 33,330 33,610 33,960 34,810 35,670 
Czechia 15,430 14,900 15,060 15,370 16,520 17,640 
Germany  32,320 31,940 33,280 33,930 34,700 35,860 
Estonia 12,640 11,150 12,430 13,060 13,650 15,090 
Ireland 38,600 36,790 36,690 39,890 50,710 57,960 
Spain 24,200 23,040 22,080 22,210 23,760 24,880 
France 31,310 30,690 31,160 31,320 31,770 32,830 
Lithuania 10,110 9,030 10,300 11,250 12,040 13,310 
Hungary 10,500 9,900 10,010 10,690 11,410 12,560 
Netherlands 39,810 38,470 38,340 38,580 39,810 41,540 
Poland 8,910 9,390 10,020 10,510 11,260 12,430 
Portugal 17,260 16,990 16,110 16,260 17,010 18,110 
Slovenia 19,190 17,750 17,360 17,620 18,540 20,170 
Finland 37,330 35,080 35,140 34,390 35,280 36,820 
Sweden 39,930 39,920 40,270 41,060 42,910 43,850 
United Kingdom 30,940 29,750 30,200 31,220 32,050 32,710 
Norway 68,610 66,220 66,900 67,340 68,090 69,530 
Switzerland 57,030 56,150 56,660 57,730 58,200 59,870 
Source: Eurostat database 
Table 14: Social benefits in cash or kind as percentage of GDP 
Country 2008  2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Belgium 29.32 31.36 32.44 33.01 32.62 32.81 
Czech Republic 21.38 23.55 23.71 23.41 22.37 22.39 
Estonia 20.74 23.89 20.87 20.9 22.79 22.68 
Finland 28.43 32.61 33.79 35.32 35.06 33.41 
France 32.22 34.74 35.02 35.65 35.37 34.79 
Germany 27.3 29.13 27.78 27.93 28.33 28.34 
Hungary 26.66 26.58 25.32 23.57 22.77 21.33 
Ireland 24.32 26.98 25.67 22.63 16.74 15.35 
Lithuania 21.82 25.76 21.86 20.14 20.68 21.44 
Netherlands 24.99 28.52 28.98 28.91 27.79 26.8 
Norway 23.76 27.88 27.23 28.57 31.92 30.1 
Poland 23.86 24.86 23.74 24.24 25.11 24.66 
Portugal 25.76 28.03 27.7 27.65 26.66 25.78 
Slovenia 25.94 29.96 30.15 28.51 27.67 26.42 
Spain 23.12 26.97 27.6 27.6 26.62 26.33 
Sweden 31.53 31.81 32.22 32.38 32.37 31.57 
Switzerland 14.42 15.68 15.84 16 16.38 16.11 
United Kingdom 24.56 27.43 27.14 26.24 25.46 24.59 




Table 15: Share of first-time asylum applicants in population 
Country 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Belgium 0.104% 0.199% 0.166% 0.126% 0.126% 0.159% 
Czechia 0.010% 0.004% 0.005% 0.009% 0.011% 0.013% 
Germany  0.026% 0.050% 0.080% 0.214% 0.879% 0.196% 
Estonia 0.001% 0.002% 0.006% 0.011% 0.011% 0.007% 
Ireland 0.085% 0.042% 0.020% 0.031% 0.047% 0.076% 
Spain . 0.005% 0.005% 0.012% 0.034% 0.113% 
France . 0.074% 0.083% 0.089% 0.115% 0.166% 
Lithuania . 0.012% 0.019% 0.013% 0.014% 0.014% 
Hungary . . . 0.417% 0.287% 0.006% 
Netherlands 0.082% 0.080% 0.058% 0.129% 0.114% 0.119% 
Poland 0.019% 0.011% 0.024% 0.015% 0.026% 0.006% 
Portugal 0.002% 0.001% 0.003% 0.004% 0.007% 0.012% 
Slovenia 0.012% 0.010% 0.013% 0.017% 0.061% 0.135% 
Finland . . 0.054% 0.064% 0.096% 0.053% 
Sweden 0.264% 0.340% 0.462% 0.777% 0.227% 0.179% 
United Kingdom 0.051% 0.036% 0.044% 0.050% 0.060% 0.058% 
Norway 0.296% 0.191% 0.185% 0.214% 0.062% 0.048% 
Switzerland 0.218% 0.198% 0.357% 0.289% 0.326% 0.179% 
Source: Eurostat database 
Table 16: Share of foreigners in population 
Country 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Belgium . 13.87% 15.15% 15.64% 16.32% 16.81% 
Czechia . 3.79% 3.72% 3.77% 4.11% 4.41% 
Germany  . 12.00% 11.35% 12.14% 13.27% 16.60% 
Estonia . 16.26% 16.00% 14.94% 14.73% 14.87% 
Ireland 16.15% 16.06% 16.84% 16.27% 16.37% 16.79% 
Spain 12.87% 13.51% 13.45% 12.81% 12.74% 13.29% 
France 11.06% 11.31% 11.43% 11.71% 11.97% 12.22% 
Lithuania 5.54% 5.12% 4.78% 4.67% 4.49% 4.66% 
Hungary . 4.36% 4.05% 4.53% 5.12% 5.48% 
Netherlands . 11.06% 11.39% 11.61% 12.11% 12.90% 
Poland . 1.69% 1.66% 1.63% 1.65% 1.83% 
Portugal . 7.21% 8.08% 8.24% 8.44% 8.84% 
Slovenia . 12.40% 11.19% 11.42% 11.69% 12.11% 
Finland . 4.27% 4.83% 5.46% 6.00% 6.60% 
Sweden . 14.32% 15.04% 15.89% 17.00% 18.53% 
United Kingdom . 11.39% 12.23% 12.49% 13.30% 14.35% 
Norway . 10.81% 12.34% 13.79% 14.85% 15.53% 
Switzerland . . 25.57% 26.82% 27.91% 28.67% 








Table 17: Short-term unemployment rate 
Country 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Belgium 6.975  8.317  7.567  8.533  7.858  5.958  
Czechia 4.408  7.292  6.975  6.117  3.967  2.267  
Estonia 5.517  16.742  9.992  7.383  6.767  5.375  
Finland 6.367  8.383  7.683  8.658  8.792  7.358  
France 7.425  9.267  9.767  10.308  10.067  9.058  
Germany 7.425  6.967  5.383  4.992  4.133  3.400  
Hungary 7.800  11.167  11.017  7.742  5.100  3.708  
Iceland  2.983  7.558  6.025  4.958  3.008  2.742  
Lithuania 5.825  17.842  13.408  10.725  7.900  6.183  
Netherlands 3.667  5.008  5.825  7.425  6.025  3.842  
Poland 7.042  9.675  10.108  9.017  6.192  3.858  
Portugal 8.783  11.983  15.783  14.125  11.175  7.050  
Slovenia 4.392  7.275  8.892  9.742  8.008  5.133  
Spain 11.267  19.875  24.792  24.450  19.650  15.258  
Sweden 6.167  8.575  7.967  7.933  6.950  6.283  
Switzerland .. 4.803  4.484  4.829  4.919  4.714  
United Kingdom 5.617  7.808  7.925  6.142  4.825  4.017  




Appendix G: Google Trends Analysis 
Figure 1: Worldwide Google Trends analysis on “European Migrant Crisis” 
 
